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Abstract 
We examine the effects of the revised Basel II rules on bank managers’ discretionary 
behavior. Specifically, we ascertain whether bank managers engage in more income 
smoothing and whether they defer loan loss provisioning as a result of increased 
regulatory pressure from anticipated changes to the Basel Accord. We predict that the 
revised rules will increase regulatory pressure on the corporate banking business which is 
likely to be more affected than the retail banking business by these changes. Corporate 
banking managers may react by reducing risk-taking activities or by increasing income 
smoothing activities. We find evidence of greater (less) income smoothing in the 
corporate banking business of low-capital (high-capital) banks during the Basel II period. 
We also find that corporate banking managers of these weaker banks recognize loan loss 
provisions in a less timely manner. In contrast, we do not find these effects for retail 
banking businesses. Finally, we find that the market reacts negatively to Basel II 
regulatory announcements initially but the adverse market reaction reduces over time.  
Overall, our study provides evidence of unintended consequences arising from the 
changes to banking rules as proposed under Basel II. 
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1. Introduction  
The Basel II Accord places greater emphasis on the risk sensitivity of bank assets than 
the 1988 Basel Accord (i.e., Basel I). Basel II attempts to constrain banks’ risk-taking activities 
by imposing higher capital requirements on banks with riskier assets (Basel, 2006). Banks trade 
off the returns and risks of different activities and may engage in higher or lower risk-taking 
activities in response to the changes in Basel II. In this study, we examine whether the proposed 
changes in banking regulation are associated with greater discretionary behavior in bank 
financial reporting. Our findings suggest that there might be unintended consequences as a result 
of changes to banking rules proposed by Basel II. The decision to improve banks’ capital 
adequacy put increased regulatory pressure on some banks to engage in manipulative behavior in 
the form of greater income smoothing and less timely loan loss recognition. 
Prior banking research shows that bank managers have incentives to engage in three 
types of discretionary behavior (e.g., Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo, 1995; Collins, 
Shackelford and Wahlen, 1995; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999; 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Yang 2004; Perez, Salas-Fumas and Saurina, 2008). First, bank 
managers are prone to manage capital because proper capital management is crucial in 
determining the effectiveness of bank operations. Specifically, bank managers will decrease loan 
loss provisions when their banks’ capital adequacy ratios are high and vice versa. Second, bank 
managers have incentives to engage in income smoothing behavior. That is, they will decrease 
loan loss provisions when income is low and vice versa. Third, bank managers may also engage 
in discretionary behavior to signal future earnings performance. Thus, they will increase loan 
loss provisions when they anticipate that future income will be high.  
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We examine how managers react to the proposed regulatory changes to the Basel Accord. 
Specifically, we focus on the impact of these changes on income smoothing and timeliness of 
loan loss provisioning. By imposing more stringent capital requirements and stricter supervisory 
monitoring for risky banks, Basel II rules attempt to remedy a major weakness of the Basel I 
Accord, which is the failure to distinguish across levels of credit risk in commercial and 
industrial loans (Jacques 2008). Under Basel I, all commercial loans, regardless of credit quality, 
are assigned a 100% risk-weight. In contrast to the Basel I Accord, Basel II rules take into 
account differences in the credit ratings of loans held by banks (Basel, 2006). Thus, Basel II is 
expected to reduce banks’ risk-taking incentives (Elizalde 2007). 
Corporate banking is generally riskier than retail banking (Kohler, 2013). Hence, we 
expect the revised Basel II rules to impact corporate and investment banking activities more than 
retail banking. The increased regulatory pressure may induce corporate banking managers to 
either reduce their risky activities or engage in greater income smoothing to reduce their earnings 
volatility and perceived risk. Corporate banking managers of banks with low capital adequacy 
ratios need to maintain their risky activities in order to sustain their revenue streams. Hence, any 
reduction of risky activities will negatively impact corporate banking earnings and shrink the 
earnings base of low-capital banks. We predict that corporate banking managers are more likely 
to engage in greater income smoothing to reduce their perceived earnings volatility and 
perceived risk. On the other hand, banks with high capital adequacy ratios have the capacity to 
reduce their risk-taking activities and may not resort to income smoothing. Therefore, we predict 
that the revised Basel rules will create increased regulatory pressure for corporate banking 
managers of low-capital banks to engage in greater income smoothing relative to the corporate 
banking managers of high-capital banks.  
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We also examine the impact of these changes on the timeliness of loan loss recognition 
for both corporate and retail banking businesses. Basel II rules impose a more sophisticated risk 
assessment structure on banks than Basel I rules. These rules require banks to more accurately 
assess their capital adequacy and risk positions. Although the banks in our sample use the 
incurred loan loss provisioning method under either US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles) or IFRS, they still have substantial discretion in determining their loan loss provisions. 
One possibility is that the greater risk sensitivity from regulatory reporting may spill over to the 
financial reporting practices of the banks. As a result, banks will be more timely in recognizing 
loan loss provisions on their loan portfolios. On the other hand, stricter capital requirements may 
impose greater regulatory pressure on banks to delay their loan loss recognition so as to 
artificially bolster their reserves. In particular, we expect corporate banking managers in low-
capital banks to be more inclined to impose less timely loan loss provisions because they are 
more adversely affected by the Basel II rule changes.  
We use a sample of banks from the countries that led the Basel II Accord (i.e., USA, UK, 
Europe, Canada and Australia) to examine the effects of bank regulatory changes on bank 
managers’ discretionary behavior. We obtain data on these banks from the Bankscope database. 
Our sample period covers 1999 to 2007 because the revised Basel II Accord was first 
conceptualized in 1999 and implemented by the majority of banks by 2007.1 We partition the 
sample banks into high Tier 1 capital banks and low Tier 1 capital banks. We analyze the banks 
at the segmental level because we are interested in assessing the differential impact of Basel II on 
                                                 
1 Unlike many regulatory changes, there is no definite cut-off date for Basel II implementation. Instead, it is a 
phased implementation across different jurisdictions and banks. We end the sample period in 2007 because of the 
global financial crisis of 2008, which imposed significant changes to banks’ operations and discretionary reporting 
behavior. Including the financial crisis years in our sample could confound our results because of the difficulty in 
disentangling the impact from the financial crisis on managerial behavior from the impact of the Basel II regulatory 
changes. We repeat the analysis after excluding the year 2007 from the sample period because 2007 is the year Basel 
II went into effect in the US. Our results are robust to this sensitivity check.  
 4 
different business segments within the bank. Hence, we hand-collect the loan loss provisions and 
profits before taxes and loan loss provisions of corporate banking businesses and retail banking 
businesses from the segmental reporting sections in the footnote disclosures of each bank’s 
financial statements. 
We find evidence of income smoothing by corporate banking managers of low-capital 
banks from 2003 to 2007 (hereafter, the “Basel II period”). Relative to the pre-Basel II period, 
we observe during this period that these corporate banking managers increase (decrease) their 
loan loss provisions when the level of prior period pre-tax earnings before loan loss provisions is 
high (low). Consistent with Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), this evidence indicates the presence of 
income smoothing. In additional tests, we document that the income smoothing effect is more 
pronounced in the later period (2005-2007) than in the earlier period (2003-2004) of our sample 
period.  
For our second set of tests, we find a delay in the timeliness of recognition of loan loss 
provisions from the corporate banking managers of low-capital banks during the later part of the 
Basel II period (i.e., 2005-2007). This result reinforces the notion that corporate banking 
managers of weaker banks faced greater regulatory pressure and thus engage in certain 
manipulative behavior in anticipation of the changes imposed by Basel II. In contrast, we do not 
document any differences in the timeliness of loan loss provisions for retail banking businesses 
during our sample period.  
Finally, we examine how market participants interpret and react to the effects of these 
rule changes on the affected banks. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the market 
initially reacts negatively to regulatory announcements regarding Basel II implementation across 
all banks. The negative market reaction is greater for banks with more corporate banking 
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business than for banks with more retail banking business. While there is a negative market 
reaction to these regulatory announcements, we also find that the negative market reaction 
weakens over time as banks are more geared toward the implementation of Basel II rule changes. 
Overall, these findings provide support that Basel II imposes differential market pressure on 
banks.   
Our study contributes to the stream of research that examines the interaction of bank 
managers’ behavior and regulatory changes. In particular, we examine how bank managers 
anticipate and respond to changes to banks’ operating environments imposed by regulatory 
authorities. We show that greater regulatory pressure and a more intense competitive 
environment due to more stringent capital requirements induce bank managers to increase 
income smoothing and to defer loan loss provisioning. Our findings have implications for 
regulators and accounting standard setters who are concerned with whether changes to the 
regulatory environment of banks might lead to deterioration in banks’ financial reporting quality. 
This is especially so as banks are starting to assess and prepare for the impact of the proposed 
Basel III rules on their capital structure and operating profitability.   
The next section develops our hypotheses development and the institutional background 
surrounding Basel II implementation. Section 3 describes the sample and empirical measures. 
Section 4 discusses the test results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Basel II changes 
Basel II rules introduce substantial changes to the banking regulatory environment. In 
particular, these rules impose more refined risk measurement rules that impact both retail and 
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corporate banking businesses. As a result of changes from the 1988 Basel I Accord to the current 
framework, there are several approaches that banks can adopt to assess the credit risks of their 
loan portfolios. These approaches are (1) the standardized approach, (2) the foundation internal 
ratings based (F-IRB) approach, and (3) the advanced internal ratings based (A-IRB) approach 
(Basel 2006).2 Overall, the risk sensitivity and stringency in capital calculations have increased 
under Basel II rules relative to Basel I rules. Hence, there is greater regulatory pressure imposed 
on banks’ operations. 
The modifications to risk assessments in the Basel II Accord impact retail and corporate 
exposures differently. In the standardized approach, the retail exposures (e.g., personal term 
loans, credit cards, excluding mortgage loans) and loans secured by residential properties are risk 
weighted at 75% and 35% respectively. Past due loans are risk weighted at 150% (100%) when 
specific provisions are less than (no less than) 20% of the outstanding loan amounts. The 
exposures to sovereigns, banks, public sector entities, corporates are risk weighted based on 
external credit ratings in the standardized approach. For example, the risk weights on corporate 
exposures range from 20% for borrowers rated AAA/AA- to 150% for borrowers rated below 
BB-. In the IRB approaches, banks must provide their estimates of PD, LGD and EAD for retail 
exposures. 3  For corporate exposures, under the F-IRB approach, banks provide their own 
estimates of PD but must use supervisory estimates for other risk parameters while under the A-
IRB approach, banks must calculate all the risk components. The different risk weights and 
                                                 
2All three approaches increase the sensitivity of capital requirements to risk assessments. However, there are 
variations to how risk is calculated depending on which approaches banks choose to adopt. Specifically, the 
standardized approach uses standard risk buckets and risk weights that vary by products, credit ratings and 
collaterals. In contrast, banks that apply the internal ratings based approaches (i.e., F-IRB or A-IRB approaches) will 
calculate credit risks based on their internal risk models. 
3 The risk parameters to the risk models are probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at 
default (EAD) and maturity (M). 
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estimates of risk components in Basel II thus lead to differential capital requirements between 
retail and corporate banking businesses.  
Prior research has examined how the impact from the revised Basel II guidelines will 
affect banks. This stream of research is primarily concerned with whether Basel II rules changes 
will exacerbate pro-cyclicality in bank lending behavior (e.g., Gordy and Howells 2006). They 
find that these regulatory changes amplify the pro-cyclicality inherent in bank lending behavior. 
In particular, the risk sensitive capital requirements in Basel II rules reinforce the pro-cyclicality 
of bank behavior in the following manner. As bank assets and loans are assigned higher risk 
weightings during economic downturns, required capital will increase. At the same time, capital 
positions tend to deteriorate as loan losses accelerate. Such a situation would induce banks to 
reduce lending and increase lending margins, which will contribute to the pro-cyclicality of bank 
lending behavior. A recent study using the Australian regulatory setting finds that Australia’s 
forward-looking regulatory provisions lead managers to use their discretion in setting regulatory 
provisions to dampen the impact of credit market volatilities on lending activities (Cummings 
and Durrani, 2014). However, what is unaddressed in this stream of research is whether the 
revised Basel II rules would induce changes to banks’ financial reporting behavior and financial 
reporting quality.  
 
2.2 Income smoothing hypotheses  
A theoretical reason for banks to engage in income smoothing is to reduce the perceived 
risk inherent in banks’ operations. This is because income smoothing is able to reduce earnings 
variability, which in turn reduces perceived risk (Francis et al. 2004). The revised rules under 
Basel II impose greater regulatory pressure on bank managers. Specifically, the introduction of 
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more refined risk measurement rules that would lead to greater capital requirements would have 
an adverse impact on the profitability of banks’ operations. As a result, we hypothesize that bank 
managers would face greater pressure to engage in income smoothing activities. In addition, for 
reasons discussed earlier, we expect the regulatory pressure arising from the Basel II Accord to 
differentially affect the income smoothing activities of corporate and retail banking businesses.  
Prior to Basel II implementation, the corporate and investment banking businesses of 
banks had advantages over retail businesses as the former faced lower capital requirements. 
However, regulators and governments have recognized the risks posed by corporate and 
investment banking businesses, especially in light of the recent financial crisis. Hence, there is 
greater attention paid to the risks of these corporate banking businesses, with specific capital 
rules imposed on them in Basel II. In order to mitigate the perceived higher risks as a result of 
these regulatory changes, corporate banking managers may either reduce their risk-taking 
activities or engage in more income smoothing activities.  
Corporate banking managers of weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios face 
constraints in reducing risk-taking activities. This is because these risky activities tend to 
generate greater earnings that increase shareholder equity (which constitutes part of banks’ 
capital). Hence, these bank managers may resort to greater income smoothing to reduce 
perceived risk. On the other hand, the managers of stronger banks with a larger capital base have 
more choices. They can either reduce risk-taking activities or engage in income smoothing to 
mitigate the market pressures arising from the greater risk sensitivity under Basel II. If the 
corporate banking managers of high capital banks reduce risk-taking activities, their actual 
earnings variability reduces. Consequently, these banks do not need to engage in as much income 
smoothing as low capital banks. We thus hypothesize that regulatory pressure will induce bank 
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managers that oversee corporate banking businesses to engage in income smoothing among the 
weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios. Accordingly, we express our first hypothesis, in 
alternative form, as follows. 
H1:  Corporate banking managers with low capital adequacy ratios will engage in 
greater income smoothing during the Basel II period.    
Another important issue is whether there are changes to the timeliness of loan loss 
provisions during the Basel II period. On the one hand, Basel II rule changes impose changes to 
the risk assessment framework of banks’ loan portfolios. These rule changes can conceivably 
lead banks to more accurately assess their capital adequacy and risk positions. As a result, banks 
might be in a better position to enact timelier loan loss provisions on their loan portfolios. On the 
other hand, regulatory pressure might induce banks to delay loan loss recognition. In particular, 
corporate banking managers may be more inclined to impose less timely loan loss provisions 
than retail banking business managers because the former are more adversely affected by Basel 
II implementation rule changes. Liu and Ryan (1995) hypothesize that the timeliness of loan loss 
provisions decreases as discretion over the provisions increases. Bank managers tend to have 
more discretion over loans of large sizes, namely, corporate loans than over smaller loans (e.g., 
consumer loans). They find that the market reaction is positive (negative) for banks with high 
(low) proportion of large loans, consistent with their hypothesis. Thus, we expect a delay in the 
timeliness of loan loss recognition among corporate banking managers of low-capital banks as a 
result of Basel II rule changes. Accordingly, we express our second hypothesis, in alternative 
form, as follows. 
H2:  Corporate banking managers with low capital adequacy ratios will engage in 
delayed recognition of loan loss provisions during the Basel II period.    
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Our third set of tests examines the market reaction to a series of Basel II announcements. 
If Basel II rules imposed greater regulatory pressure on corporate banking businesses relative to 
retail banking businesses, we expect a negative market reaction to these announcements as the 
regulatory changes adversely impact the capital adequacy ratios of banks with more corporate 
banking business than retail banking business. On the other hand, we expect the market to react 
favorably to Basel II announcements if these revised rules are expected to enhance the 
competitiveness and improve the capital adequacy of the affected banks.4 Thus, it is an empirical 
question how market participants will react to a series of regulatory announcements on Basel II 
changes. Hence, we express our third hypothesis, in null form, as follows: 
H3:  The market reaction to Basel II announcements does not differ between banks 
with more corporate banking business and banks with more retail banking 
business.  
  
3. Research Design  
Our sample covers banks from USA, UK, Europe, Canada and Australia drawn from the 
Bankscope database and spans 1999 to 2007. For each bank, the loan losses and profits before 
taxes are disclosed and reported at the business segment level (i.e., retail and corporate banking 
businesses) located in the footnote disclosures of the banks’ annual financial reports. We hand-
collect the segmental information pertaining to the retail and corporate businesses for each bank 
in our sample. We obtain data for the other variables, i.e., non-performing loans, change in non-
performing loans, loan growth and Tier 1 capital ratios, from either Bankscope or if unavailable, 
by manually collection from banks’ annual reports.  
                                                 
4 For example, the Basel II capital requirements on retail banking businesses may be closer to the simulated models 
for low credit risk segments (Perli and Navda, 2004). 
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We estimate the following regression to test our first hypothesis:   
LLit =  α0 + α1 Retailit + α2 Corpit + α3 Lowcap*Retailit + α4 Lowcap*Corpit  
+ α5 Basel*Retailit + α6 Basel*Corpit + α7 Basel*Lowcap*Retailit  
+ α8 Basel*Lowcap*Corpit + α9 CAPit + α10 NPLit-1 + α11 ∆NPLit  
+ α12∆LOANit + α13Lowcapit +  εit     (1) 
where LL is measured either as LLCorp or LLRetail. LLCorp (LLRetail) is corporate 
(retail) provision for loan losses; Retail (Corporate) is retail (corporate) profit before tax and 
loan loss provisions; Lowcap is an indicator variable that equals one for banks with below 
median Tier 1 capital ratio (hereafter ‘low capital banks’), 0 otherwise (hereafter ‘high capital 
banks’); Basel is an indicator variable that equals one if the bank-year observation is in the Basel 
II period, 0 otherwise. The Basel II period spans 2003 to 2007 when the third and final 
consultative paper on Basel II was issued by the Basel Committee and consensus on the Basel II 
framework was achieved. The market and the banks are expected to react to the impending Basel 
II rules during this phase before the effective date of 2008.   
Our regression equation is adapted from those used in Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) and 
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011). Similar to these papers, we include CAP which is the 
bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio, NPL which is the bank’s nonperforming loans at the beginning of the 
year, ∆NPL which is the change in nonperforming loans from the prior year to the current year, 
and ∆LOAN which is the change in total loans outstanding from the prior year to the current year, 
to control for the non-discretionary portion of loan provisions. Thus it relates the discretionary 
portion of corporate and retail loan provisions to corporate and retail banking businesses’ profits 
before taxes and loan provisions. 
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Model (1) estimates the income smoothing coefficients for each combination of 
Corporate/Retail, High/Low Tier I capital ratio, and Basel II/Pre-Basel II periods. The baseline 
measures of income smoothing are α1 and α2. These measures followed those of prior research on 
income smoothing (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al. 2004). A negative α1 (α2) suggests that retail 
(corporate) banking managers increase their loan loss provisions when their profits before tax 
and loan provisions increase during the pre-Basel II period. We interact our measure of loan 
smoothing with the extent of banks’ Tier 1 capital. In these interaction variables, a negative α3 
(α4) shows that managers who oversee the retail banking businesses (corporate banking 
businesses) of banks engage in more income smoothing activities when their Tier 1 capital is 
below the median Tier 1 capital ratio of banks in our sample. 
To test H1, we examine whether the coefficients on Basel*Lowcap*Retail and 
Basel*Lowcap*Corp are significant and positive. A negative α7 (i.e., the coefficient of 
Basel*Lowcap*Retail) means that loan loss provisions are used to a greater extent to smooth the 
bank’s profit before tax by retail banking managers of low-capital banks during the Basel II 
period. Likewise, a negative α8 (i.e., the coefficient of Basel*Lowcap*Corp) means that loan loss 
provisions are used to a greater extent to smooth the bank’s profit before tax by corporate 
banking managers of low-capital banks during the Basel II period. We thus interpret a 
statistically significant negative coefficient on α7 (α8) to imply that retail (corporate) managers of 
low-capital banks engage in more income smoothing activities in anticipation of Basel II rule 
changes.  
For our second hypothesis, we estimate the following regression model: 
LLit =  α0 + α1 ∆NPLit + α2 ∆NPLit-1 + α3∆LOANit + α4Lowcapit  
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+ α5Basel + α6Lowcapit*Basel + α7Lowcapit*∆NPLit + α8 Lowcapit 
*∆NPLit-1 + α9 Lowcapit*∆LOANit + α10Basel*∆NPLit + α11Basel*∆NPLit-1 + α12 
Basel*∆LOANit + α13Lowcapit*Basel*∆NPLit + α14 Lowcapit*Basel*∆NPLit-1 + 
α15Lowcapit*Basel*∆LOANit +  εit       (2) 
  Model (2), which is adapted from Beatty and Liao (2011), relates current LL to current 
changes in NPL for each combination of Corporate/Retail and Basel II/Pre-Basel II periods 
where LL is measured either as LLCorp or LLRetail. Specifically, LLCorp (LLRetail) is corporate 
(retail) provision for loan losses. The model also includes ∆LOAN and Lowcap as control 
variables. The coefficients of interest are the coefficients on ∆NPLit and ∆NPLit-1 for the different 
combinations of Corporate/Retail and Basel II/Pre-Basel II periods. These coefficients measure 
the timeliness of loan loss recognition, with a negative coefficient indicating that loan loss 
provisions reflect the change in non-performing loans in a more timely manner.       
H2 hypothesizes a delay in in timeliness of loan loss provisioning in the Basel II period 
for corporate banking managers of low-capital banks. Our baseline measurement variables are α1 
and α2, which are the coefficients of ∆NPLit and ∆NPLit-1. They are measures of the timeliness of 
loan loss provisions based on Beatty and Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012). 
Negative α1 and α2 demonstrates that the loan loss provisions capture the increase in non-
performing loans on a timely basis. Since we are interested in the extent of timeliness of loan 
loss recognition during the Basel II period, our variables of interest are α13 and α14. Positive α13 
and α14 (i.e., coefficients of Lowcap*Basel*∆NPLit and Lowcap*Basel*∆NPLit-1) mean that the 
loan loss provisions capture the change in non-performing loans on a less timely basis during the 
Basel II period as banks increase their timeliness in recognizing retail loan losses in response to 
greater regulatory pressure. 
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For our third hypothesis, we identify 19 events associated with Basel II implementation. 
Events 1 to 6 cover the period 1999 to 2002. This period covers the conceptualization of the 
Basel II Accord, the release of detailed information about Basel II rule changes (in the second 
consultative paper), and the achievement of general consensus toward major implementation 
issues regarding Basel II rules. News articles during this period generally indicated that banks 
would likely be badly hit by the stringent and restrictive Basel II rules, which would be costly to 
implement. This is because the revised Basel capital requirements were viewed as being tougher 
and likely to place greater pressures on certain businesses. For example, it was felt that bank 
loans to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and derivative activities would be adversely 
affected. Events 13 to 19 lasted from June 2004 to May 2006. During this period, there were 
further refinements on trading exposure rules, additional quantitative impact studies, and 
evaluation of IFRS effects on capital rules to the implementation of the standardized approach. 
Our tests are based on three-day cumulative abnormal returns for these banks centered on 
each of the 19 event dates: CARj,e, where j denotes firm and e denotes event. The expected 
returns for each bank at each event date are the average returns of the bank one month before the 
event date. The abnormal return for each bank is its raw stock return less the expected return. 
The returns data between 1999 and 2002 are computed based on the total return indices from 
Datastream. t-tests are used to compare abnormal returns at each event date between sub-samples 
of banks. Specifically, we compare differences in market reactions between two subgroups of 
banks: retail and corporate banking businesses as well as low capital and high capital banks.   
 
4. Results 
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our key variables. The retail banking 
segment’s loan losses and profit before taxes and loan losses are generally higher than the 
corporate banking segment’s loan losses and profit before taxes respectively. Specifically, the 
mean (median) value of LLretail is -0.014 (-0.010) whereas LLcorp is -0.006 (-0.000). In terms 
of profitability, the mean (median) value of Retail is 0.083 (0.084) whereas the mean (median) 
value of Corp is 0.054 (0.043). The sum of mean retail and corporate banking loan losses and the 
mean non-performing loans are 2% and 7.1% respectively. These measures are scaled by 
beginning market value of equity.  
Table 2 shows the Spearman correlation matrix. The negative correlations between Retail 
and LLretail (Corp and LLcorp) provide evidence that banks use retail (corporate) banking loan 
losses to smooth retail (corporate) banking segment’s income. At the business segment level, the 
negative correlation between Retail and Corp indicates that banks tend to focus on either retail or 
corporate businesses. The negative correlation between NPL and ∆NPL suggests that the higher 
the level of non-performing loans in prior periods, the more likely the banks are able to reduce 
non-performing loans in the subsequent period. The positive correlation between ∆Loan and 
∆NPL shows that greater loan growth leads to an increase in non-performing loans. These results 
are generally consistent with the empirical evidence in Salas and Saurina (2002).  
Table 3 reports the results of our regression analyses that examine the impact of income 
smoothing during the Basel II period using retail and corporate loan loss losses. The negative 
coefficients of Retail (in the column with dependent variable LLretail) and Corp (in the column 
with dependent variable LLcorp) show that income smoothing using loan loss provisions occur 
for both the retail and corporate banking businesses. In the column with LLcorp as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient of Lowcap*Corp is positive, indicating that corporate banking managers 
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of weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios smooth their income to a lesser extent prior to 
the Basel II period. The result suggests that there is less regulatory pressure on corporate banking 
businesses before the Basel II period. The coefficient of Basel*Corp is also positive indicating 
that during the Basel II period, the corporate banking businesses of high capital banks faced less 
regulatory pressure. The coefficient of our key variable Basel*Lowcap*Corp (-0.2172) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This result suggests that during the Basel II 
period, the corporate banking managers of weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios faced 
more regulatory pressure; consequently, they smooth income to a greater extent than the 
corporate banking managers of the stronger banks with high capital adequacy ratios during this 
period, consistent with hypothesis 1. Overall, these results support our first hypothesis that 
corporate banking managers of low-capital (high-capital) banks engage in more (less) income 
smoothing activities during the Basel II period. In contrast, we do not document any impact to 
the retail banking businesses for income smoothing during this period. 
Table 4 reports the regression results comparing the time-series differences of the income 
smoothing trends during the Basel II period. Specifically, we partition our sample observations 
into two periods: the early Basel II period (2003 to 2004) and the late Basel II period (2005 to 
2007). The negative (positive) and statistically significant coefficient of our key variable 
Basel0507*Lowcap*Corp (Basel0507*Corp) are present only in the late Basel II period (Table 4 
Panel B), but not in the early Basel II period (Table 4 Panel A). The result suggests that the 
managers of corporate banking businesses of low-capital (high-capital) banks engage in more 
(less) income smoothing in the late Basel II period than in the early Basel II period. Thus, we 
document some evidence that corporate banking managers intensified their income smoothing 
activities in the latter part of our sample period.   
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Table 5 reports the results of regressions that examine the timeliness of loan loss 
provisions for corporate and retail banking businesses at the segmental level during the latter part 
of the Basel II period (i.e., 2005-2007). The coefficient of ∆NPL is positive and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level for corporate banking businesses but not for retail banking businesses. 
This result indicates that corporate banking loan loss provisions increase when non-performing 
loans decrease consistent with the notion that corporate banking managers have more discretion 
to vary the timeliness of loan loss provisions.  
The coefficient of Lowcap*Basel0507*∆NPL(t) is positive and statistically significant 
when the dependent variable is LLCorp. This result suggests that corporate banking loan loss 
provisions capture the change in non-performing loans on a less timely basis during the late 
Basel II period. We do not document any impact in the timeliness of loan loss provisions for 
retail banking businesses during our sample period. In robustness tests, we remove European 
banks from the sample as IFRS came into effect in Europe in the year 2005 and the key results 
remain. Overall, our findings provide evidence in support of our second hypothesis that 
corporate banking managers of low capital banks provide less timely loan loss provisions during 
the Basel II period. 
Table 6 reports the market reactions to important announcements regarding changes to 
Basel II rules. The market reactions to Events 1 to 12 are more negative for banks with more 
corporate banking businesses than banks with more retail banking businesses. This is particularly 
so on three events: (1) December 13, 2001 (Event 5: -2.96%) when the Basel Committee's 
quantitative impact studies suggested the revised Basel II Accord would be able to meet the 
Committee's objectives, (2) July 10, 2002 (Event 6: -2.68%) when the Basel Committee reached 
agreement on a number of important issues related to Basel II implementation, and (3) May 11, 
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2004 (Event 12: -0.84%) when the Basel Committee announced that it had achieved consensus 
on the remaining issues and would publish the text of the Basel II Accord at the end of June 2004. 
Overall, our test results suggest that the market perceives the effect of Basel II regulatory 
changes to have a more negative impact on corporate banking businesses than retail banking 
businesses during this period. This is because Basel II rules impose more stringent capital 
requirements on market risks which impact the corporate and investment banking businesses 
more than retail banking businesses. The literature also provides evidence that Basel II revisions 
appear to favor retail banking businesses (Altman and Sabato, 2005; Berger, 2004). Such 
preferential treatment is not justified by the business risks (Jacobson et. al., 2005). 
On the other hand, we find that the market reactions to Events 13 to 19 are more positive 
for banks with more corporate banking businesses than retail banking businesses. The greater 
positive market reaction to such banks occurred particularly on May 24, 2006 (Event 19: 2.88%) 
when the quantitative impact study results for the G10 countries showed that the minimum 
required capital under Pillar 1 of the Basel II Framework would decrease relative to Basel I. The 
market appeared to be relieved that the impact of Basel II rules on corporate banking businesses 
was not as negative as originally feared. The positive market reaction also corresponded with 
greater income smoothing using corporate loan losses, and more active lobbying by various 
regulators and industry groups to minimize any adverse impact from Basel II regulatory 
changes.5 In response to the lobbying, the Basel Committee revised Basel II rules to reduce the 
capital requirements for mortgage loans and SMEs. The regulations were also dampened for 
brokerages and securities houses such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Finally, there was 
                                                 
5 The lobbying regulators included US comptroller of the currency as the top regulator of national banks, US Senate 
banking committee members, US FDIC, UK FSA, Head of the China Banking Regulatory Commission. The 
lobbying industry groups include Securities Industry Association, , British Bankers Association, European Banking 
Association, French banking federation, Banking industry bodies such as BMA and ISDA, Institute of International 
Finance (IIF), European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association. 
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a growing awareness that some banks could potentially reduce their capital requirements under 
Basel II’s advanced IRB approach.  
 We also compare the market reactions between low capital banks and high capital banks. 
During the early part of our sample period (Events 1-12), the market reaction was more negative 
for low capital banks than high capital banks. The market seemed concerned that Basel II rules 
would have a more negative impact on low capital banks than on high capital banks. However, 
during the later part of our sample period (Events 13-19), the market reaction is more receptive 
toward low capital banks than high capital banks. This is possibly because subsequent 
refinements and political lobbying mitigated the impact of Basel II on low capital banks.   
For all the 19 events taken together, the market abnormal returns to the overall sample, 
the banks with low Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios and the banks with more corporate banking 
businesses are not statistically significantly different from zero. The market appears to have 
recovered from the initial negative shock at the announcement of Basel II. Conversely, the 
overall market reactions to the 19 Basel II events are positive for banks with high Tier 1 capital 
adequacy ratios and for banks with more retail banking businesses. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that the implementation of Basel II benefits the strongly capitalized banks and the retail 
banking businesses because they are able to gain competitive advantage over the weakly 
capitalized and the corporate banking businesses as a result of these regulatory changes. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper examines the interaction between a major banking regulatory policy change 
(i.e., Basel II rule changes) and its impact on bank managers’ discretionary behavior. Our 
research finds evidence to suggest that among the weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios, 
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the corporate banking managers of these banks smooth income to a greater extent during the 
Basel II period than their counterparts in the stronger banks. This is likely because of the more 
stringent capital requirements on corporate and investment banking businesses due to Basel II 
regulatory changes. We also find that this effect is more prevalent in the latter part of the Basel II 
period while it is non-existent in the early part of the Basel II period. 
Likewise, we also find that, among the weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios, 
the corporate banking managers of these banks reduce the timeliness of their loan loss provisions 
in the latter part of the Basel II period. Finally, we find that the market reacts more negatively for 
banks with more corporate banking businesses than for banks with more retail banking 
businesses during the Basel II period. However, the negative market reaction regarding Basel II 
announcements toward the former group of banks becomes negligible toward the end of the 
Basel II period.  
Our research provides inputs to policy makers, showing that banks that are affected by 
capital regulations may engage in discretionary behavior such as income smoothing and delaying 
the recognition of loan losses. Corporate banking businesses faced increased regulatory risks as a 
result of Basel II implementation. Hence, to mitigate these risks, it appears that among the 
weaker banks, the managers of these banks who oversee corporate banking businesses engage in 
greater income smoothing activities and delayed loan loss recognition.        
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in our regression analyses. LLretail is retail 
loan losses scaled by prior year market capitalization, LLcorp is corporate loan losses scaled by prior year 
market capitalization, Retail is retail profit before tax excluding loan losses, scaled by prior year market 
capitalization, Corp is corporate profit before tax excluding loan losses, scaled by prior year market 
capitalization, CAP  is Tier 1 capital ratio as defined by Basel rules, NPL is non-performing loans for 
prior year, scaled by market capitalization, ∆NPL is change in non-performing loans from prior year to 
current year, scaled by market capitalization, Basel is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 2003 to 2007, 0 
otherwise; Basel0304 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 2003 to 2004, 0 otherwise; Basel0507 is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for 2005 to 2007, 0 otherwise; Lowcap is an indicator variable for bank-year 
observation with Tier 1 capital ratio below the median capital ratio, 0 otherwise.   
                 
   Obs Mean Std 
Dev 
Median Min Max  
 
         
LLretail  702 -0.014 0.019 -0.010 -0.166 0.106  
LLcorp  702 -0.006 0.014 -0.000 -0.133 0.008  
Retail  702 0.083 0.061 0.084 0.000 0.498  
Corp  702 0.054 0.060 0.043 -0.059 0.388  
CAP  702 0.107 0.075 0.094 0.051 0.920  
NPL  702 0.071 0.152 0.024 0.000 2.008  
∆NPL  702 -0.007 0.091 -0.000 -1.425 0.841  
∆Loan  702 -0.132 1.988 0.000 -12.664 13.314  
Basel  702 0.729  0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000  
Basel0304  702 0.235 0.424 0.000 0.000 1.000  
Basel0507  702 0.494 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000  
Lowcap  702 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000  
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TABLE 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents the correlations among the variables used in the empirical analyses. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are found above (below) 
the diagonal. The variables are defined in Table 1. Correlations in bold are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
  
             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
LLretail (1) 1.000            
             
LLcorp(2) 0.09 1.000           
             
Retail (3) -0.47 0.12 1.000          
             
Corp (4) 0.05 -0.38 -0.31 1.000         
             
Cap (5) 0.15 0.10 -0.15 -0.05 1.000        
             
NPL (6) -0.18 -0.29 0.01 0.24 -0.11 1.000       
             
∆NPL (7) -0.17 0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.55 1.000      
             
∆Loan (8) -0.17 0.05 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.28 0.40 1.000     
    
Basel0304 (9) 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 1.000    
             
Basel0507 (10) 0.09 0.16 -0.13 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.55 1.000   
             
Basel (11) 0.13 0.21 -0.10 0.11 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 0.34 0.60 1.000  
             
Lowcap (12) -0.14 -0.17 0.02 0.22 -0.38 0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.01 1.000 
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TABLE 3: Regression Analyses – Basel II (2003-2007) and income smoothing  
 
This table reports the results of our regressions that examine the impact of income smoothing during the 
Basel II period using retail and corporate loan loss losses obtained from the segmental results of banks’ 
footnote disclosures. The variables are defined in Table 1. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
      
LLretail LLcorp 
   
      
Retail -0.1257*** 0.0238** 
(0.001) (0.044) 
Corp -0.0021 -0.1473*** 
(0.961) (0.000) 
Lowcap*Retail 0.0154 -0.0365 
(0.765) (0.384) 
Lowcap*Corp 0.0404 0.1613*** 
(0.550) (0.009) 
Basel*Retail -0.0429 -0.0168 
(0.400) (0.446) 
Basel*Corp -0.0383 0.0893*** 
(0.413) (0.025) 
Basel*Lowcap*Retail 0.0363 0.0262 
(0.595) (0.610) 
Basel*Lowcap*Corp 0.0096 -0.2172*** 
(0.894) (0.002) 
Cap 0.0359 0.0265*** 
(0.226) (0.010) 
NPL -0.0797 -0.0875 
(0.046) (0.008) 
∆NPL -0.0797 -0.0579 
(0.342) (0.119) 
∆Loan -0.0014 -0.0003 
(0.195) (0.320) 
Lowcap 0.0333 0.0154 
(0.074) (0.364) 
Basel 
 
0.0119 
(0.155) 
0.0022 
(0.556) 
Two way interaction controls Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Observations 702 702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3533 0.3166 
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TABLE 4: Regression Analyses – Early (2003-2004) and late period (2005-2007) of Basel II 
and income smoothing  
 
This table reports the results of our regressions that examine the impact of income smoothing comparing 
between the early and late period of the Basel II period using retail and corporate loan loss losses. The 
variables are defined in Table 1. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Early Basel II period      
LLretail LLcorp 
   
      
Retail -0.1474*** 0.0370*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Corp -0.0325* -0.0612*** 
(0.060) (0.000) 
Lowcap*Retail 0.0325 -0.0058 
(0.396) (0.800) 
Lowcap*Corp 0.0565** -0.0106 
(0.047) (0.767) 
Basel0304*Retail 0.0278 -0.0634** 
(0.446) (0.022) 
Basel0304*Corp 0.016 -0.0375 
(0.507) (0.390) 
Basel0304*Lowcap*Retail 0.0174 -0.0502 
(0.771) (0.272) 
Basel0304*Lowcap*Corp -0.0330 -0.0203 
(0.457) (0.736) 
Cap 0.0063 0.0138*** 
(0.299) (0.002) 
NPL -0.0737 -0.0420** 
(0.005) (0.037) 
∆NPL -0.0892 -0.0412 
(0.147) (0.165) 
∆Loan -0.0013 -0.0001 
(0.191) (0.603) 
Lowcap 0.0027 0.0026 
(0.082) (0.755) 
Basel0304 
 
-0.0002 
(0.974) 
0.0124*** 
(0.001) 
Two way interaction controls Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Observations 702 702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3525 0.2859 
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Late Basel II period      
LLretail LLcorp 
   
      
Retail -0.1261*** 0.0196*** 
(0.000) (0.055) 
Corp -0.0154 -0.0110*** 
(0.511) (0.000) 
Lowcap*Retail 0.0368 -0.0436 
(0.393) (0.124) 
Lowcap*Corp 0.0440 0.0661 
(0.258) (0.113) 
Basel0507*Retail -0.0725 0.0027 
(0.225) (0.918) 
Basel0507*Corp -0.0385 0.0777** 
(0.236) (0.012) 
Basel0507*Lowcap*Retail 0.0454 0.0609 
(0.556) (0.152) 
Basel0507*Lowcap*Corp 0.0219 -0.1374** 
(0.661) (0.019) 
Cap 0.0148 0.0135** 
(0.203) (0.027) 
NPL -0.0821 -0.0751*** 
(0.023) (0.001) 
∆NPL -0.0934 -0.0570 
(0.298) (0.168) 
∆Loan -0.0012 -0.0002 
(0.238) (0.420) 
Lowcap 0.0296 0.0121 
(0.026) (0.298) 
Basel0507 
 
0.0105* 
(0.094) 
-0.0007 
(0.859) 
Two way interaction controls Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Observations 702 702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3547 0.3054 
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TABLE 5: Regression Analyses – Timeliness of loan loss provisions 
 
This table reports the results of our regressions examining the timeliness of loan loss provisions. LL is 
loan losses scaled by prior year market capitalization. Remaining variables are defined in Table 1. p-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
      
LLretail LLcorp 
   
      
∆NPL(t) -0.0719 0.0946** 
(0.254) (0.036) 
∆NPL(t-1) -0.0375 -0.0025 
(0.214) (0.912) 
∆Loan -0.0009 -0.0006 
(0.659) (0.222) 
Lowcap -0.0032 -0.0066*** 
(0.242) (0.000) 
Basel0507 0.0075** 0.0085*** 
 (0.014) (0.007) 
Lowcap*Basel0507 -0.0035 0.0044** 
 (0.279) (0.039) 
Lowcap*∆NPL(t) 0.0435 -0.1419*** 
 (0.588) (0.006) 
Lowcap*∆NPL(t-1) -0.0627 -0.0120 
 (0.144) (0.653) 
Lowcap*∆Loan -0.0018 0.0028* 
 (0.518) (0.089) 
Basel0507*∆NPL(t) 0.1008 -0.0753 
(0.159) (0.121) 
Basel0507*∆NPL(t-1) 0.0061 0.0112 
 (0.869) (0.627) 
Basel0507*∆Loan 0.0002 0.0010 
 (0.950) (0.428) 
Lowcap*Basel0507*∆NPL(t) -0.1120 0.1173** 
 (0.205) (0.036) 
Lowcap*Basel0507*∆NPL(t-1) 0.0797 -0.0142 
 (0.103) (0.651) 
Lowcap*Basel0507*∆Loan 0.0026 -0.0034 
 (0.421) (0.104) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Observations 566 566 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1284 0.1438 
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TABLE 6: Market reaction to Basel II announcements  
 
This table reports the results of market reaction to significant Basel II announcements. Figures in bold are statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
 
Press 
release 
Date 
(Event 
no.)  
Event descriptions Overall 
Mean 
CAR     
(t stat/     
p  value) 
(n=obs) 
High 
Tier1 cap 
group 
CAR  
(t stat/     
p value) 
(n=obs) 
Low 
Tier1 cap 
group 
CAR      
(t stat/     
p value) 
(n=obs) 
Retail 
group 
CAR 
(t stat/     
p value) 
(n=obs) 
Corporate
group 
CAR      
(t stat/        
p value) 
(n=obs) 
3 June 
1999 
(1) 
The Basel Committee issued a consultative paper on a new capital adequacy 
framework, which consists of three pillars: minimum capital requirements, which 
expand on the standardized rules in the 1988 Accord; supervisory review of an 
institution's capital adequacy and internal assessment process; and effective use of 
market discipline to strengthen disclosure and encourage sound banking practices. 
0.0049 
(2.30/ 
0.022) 
(n=199) 
0.0000(0.
00/ 
0.999) 
(n=38) 
0.0047 
(0.97/ 
0.339) 
(n=38) 
0.0053 
(1.17/ 
0.248) 
(n=61) 
0.0050 
(1.27/ 
0.209) 
(n=62) 
(1) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value)6 
 
 (0.54/ 0.588) (0.04/ 0.970) 
15 
Dec 
1999 
(2) 
The Basel Committee issued a paper that provides detailed guidance on what 
disclosures should be made to the market. It is designed to strengthen the third pillar 
of the consultative paper issued in June 1999. 
-0.0156 
(-3.92/ 
0.000) 
(n=201) 
-0.0028 
(-0.36/ 
0.722) 
(n=38) 
-0.0197 
(-4.12/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
-0.0116  
(-2.39/ 
0.020) 
(n=62) 
-0.0105 
(-1.80/ 
0.076) 
(n=63) 
(2) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-1.83 /0.071) (-0.15 /0.880) 
18 Jan 
2000 
(3) 
The Basel Committee issued two supplementary papers: A New Capital Adequacy 
Framework: Pillar Three, Market Discipline proposes guidelines for bank 
disclosures. The second paper (Range of Practice in Banks’ Internal Rating Systems) 
-0.0127 
(-4.61/ 
0.000) 
0.0052 
(0.67/ 
0.510) 
-0.0280 
(-4.60/ 
0.000) 
-0.0084 
(-1.32/ 
0.190) 
-0.0185 
(-4.55/ 
0.000) 
                                                 
6 Negative t stat for Tier1 capital groups means the market reaction to the low Tier 1 capital group is less positive (or more negative) than the high 
Tier 1 capital group. Positive t stat for corporate banking groups means the market reaction to the retail banking group is more positive (or less 
negative) than to the corporate banking group.  
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assesses the current state of practice in banks’ internal rating systems and processes.  (n=202) (n=38) (n=39) (n=62) (n=63) 
(3) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-3.37 / 0.001) (1.35/ 0.180)  
16 Jan 
2001 
(4) 
The Basel Committee today issued a 2nd consultative proposal based on three pillars: 
minimum capital requirements, which refines the framework in Basel 1; supervisory 
review of a bank's capital adequacy; and market discipline, through effective 
disclosure to encourage safe and sound banking practices.  
 
0.0062 
(3.42/ 
0.001) 
(n=206) 
0.0073 
(1.60/ 
0.117) 
(n=39) 
-0.0003 
(-0.07/ 
0.941) 
(n=39) 
0.0015 
(0.44/ 
0.659) 
(n=63) 
0.0115 
(3.07/ 
0.003) 
(n=65) 
(4) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-1.26/ 0.212) (-1.99/ 0.049) 
13 
Dec 
2001 
(5) 
 
The Committee reviewed its progress toward the completion of a new Basel Capital 
Accord. The direction of the Committee's proposed modifications to the revised 
Accord has been well received and the Committee's quantitative impact studies 
suggest the revised Accord is now closer to meeting the Committee's objectives.  
-0.0202  
(-10.16/ 
0.000) 
(n=207) 
-0.0096  
(-3.23/ 
0.003) 
(n=39) 
-0.0225 
(-4.63/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
-0.0120 
(-3.50/ 
0.001) 
(n=63) 
-0.0296 
(-10.95/ 
0.000) 
(n=65) 
(5) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-2.27/ 0.026) (4.07/ 0.000) 
10 
July 
2002 
(6) 
 
The Basel Committee reached agreement on a number of important issues related to 
the New Basel Capital Accord. The Committee also approved the creation of a new 
IRB risk-weight curve that should provide a more risk-sensitive treatment of certain 
revolving retail exposures, including many credit card exposures.  
-0.0196 
(-10.31/ 
0.000) 
(n=209) 
-0.0181 
(-4.53/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
-0.0174 
(-4.36/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
-0.0159 
(-5.04/ 
0.000) 
(n=64) 
-0.0268 
(-8.04/ 
0.000) 
(n=65) 
(6) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (0.11/ 0.914) (2.37/ 0.019) 
1 Oct 
2002 
(7) 
The Basel Committee launched a comprehensive field test for banks of its proposals. 
The field test referred to as the third quantitative impact survey or QIS 3 is focused 
on the Basel II pillar one. It is undertaken with the goals of ensuring the efficacy of 
the Basel Committee's proposals and gathering information helpful to assessing 
whether further modifications are necessary prior to the release of a formal package 
for consultation in spring of 2003.  
 
0.0042 
(1.68/ 
0.094) 
(n=211) 
0.0118 
(2.82/ 
0.008) 
(n=39) 
0.0072 
(1.39/ 
0.172) 
(n=39) 
0.0126 
(3.98/ 
0.000) 
(n=64) 
0.0048 
(1.21/ 
0.230) 
(n=65) 
 31 
(7) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-0.70/ 0.486) (1.53/ 0.128) 
29 
April 
2003 
(8) 
The Basel Committee issued to banks and all other interested parties a third 
consultative paper on Basel II, with comments due by 31 July 2003. The Committee 
will make final modifications to its proposal and aim to complete the New Accord 
by the fourth quarter of 2003, with implementation to take effect in member 
countries by year-end 2006. Work has begun in a number of countries on draft rules 
that would integrate Basel capital standards with national capital regimes.  
 
0.0075 
(4.35/  
0.000) 
(n=212) 
0.0101 
(3.34/ 
0.002) 
(n=39) 
0.0120 
(2.76/ 
0.009) 
(n=39) 
0.0103 
(3.72/ 
0.000) 
(n=64) 
0.0048 
(1.51/ 
0.135) 
(n=65) 
(8) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (0.37/ 0.714) (1.30/ 0.197) 
18 
Aug 
2003 
(9) 
The Basel Committee published a report entitled “High-level Principles for the 
Cross-border Implementation of the New Accord”. As the Committee moves 
towards the completion of Basel II, this interim publication highlights the work of 
the Accord Implementation Group (AIG) in developing a set of principles to 
facilitate closer, practical cooperation and information exchange among supervisors. 
 
0.0104 
(6.95/ 
0.000) 
(n=213) 
0.0185 
(5.11/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
0.0047 
(1.61/ 
0.116) 
(n=39) 
0.0133 
(4.59/ 
0.000) 
(n=64) 
0.0100 
(3.27/ 
0.002) 
(n=65) 
(9) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-2.98/ 0.004) (0.79/ 0.431) 
11 Oct 
2003 
(10) 
The Basel Committee met to decide on responses to public comments received on 
Basel II and to deliberate the next steps. The Committee received over 200 
comments on its Third Consultative Paper, indicating broad support for the New 
Accord and agreement on the need to adopt a more risk-sensitive capital framework. 
Committee members committed to work promptly to resolve the outstanding issues 
by no later than mid-year 2004.  
  
0.0059 
(5.95/ 
0.000) 
(n=213) 
0.0103 
(4.86/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
0.0035 
(1.84/ 
0.074) 
(n=39) 
0.0080 
(4.26/ 
0.000) 
(n=64) 
0.0089 
(5.47/ 
0.000) 
(n=65) 
(10) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-2.42/ 0.018) (-0.36/ 0.719) 
 32 
15 Jan 
2004 
(11) 
The Basel Committee reviewed the progress made on outstanding matters to meet its 
mid-year 2004 objective and took decisions on key issues. The Committee has 
decided on modifications to implement the proposal made in October and will 
publish them shortly. The Committee agreed with industry comments that the cap on 
the recognition of excess provisions should not be based on Tier 2 capital 
components. Instead, it has decided to convert the cap to a percentage (to be 
determined) of credit risk-weighted assets.  
0.0135 
(8.25/ 
0.000) 
(n=213) 
0.0139 
(3.82/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
0.0192 
(4.82/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
0.0138 
(4.24/ 
0.000) 
(n=64) 
0.0165 
(5.85/ 
0.000) 
(n=65) 
(11) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (0.98/ 0.331) (-0.64/ 0.521) 
11 
May 
2004 
(12) 
The Basel Committee announced that it has achieved consensus on the remaining 
issues and will publish the text of Basel II at the end of June 2004. This text will 
serve as the basis for national rule-making and for banks to complete their 
preparations for Basel II’s implementation. 
  
-0.0006 
(-0.31/ 
0.760) 
(n=216) 
0.0067 
(1.67/ 
0.103) 
(n=39) 
0.0023 
(0.55/ 
0.584) 
(n=39) 
0.0092 
(2.91/ 
0.005) 
(n=64) 
-0.0084 
(-2.21/ 
0.030) 
(n=65) 
(12) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-0.76/ 0.452) (3.56/ 0.001) 
8 Jun 
2004 
(13) 
The Basel Committee has considered the potential impact of IFRS on regulatory 
capital. The Committee believes that, for regulatory capital purposes, it would be 
appropriate for national supervisors to exclude cumulative gains and losses on cash 
flow hedges that are recognized directly in equity from the definition of Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital. The Committee believes that the gains and losses arising from 
changes in an institution’s own credit risk under the fair value option on liabilities 
should be excluded from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.  
0.0019 
(1.59/ 
0.113) 
(n=216) 
0.0002 
(0.10/ 
0.920) 
(n=39) 
-0.0005 
(-0.25/ 
0.801) 
(n=39) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03/ 
0.976) 
(n=64) 
0.0043 
(1.86/ 
0.067) 
(n=65) 
(13) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-0.25/ 0.804) (-1.42/ 0.157) 
20 
July 
2004 
(14) 
Further to its press release of 8 June 2004, the Basel Committee considered the 
potential impact on regulatory capital of IFRS. The Committee does not make 
adjustments to capital adequacy in response to IFRS in these areas: definition of the 
trading book, equity/liability classification, intangible assets (including goodwill), 
deferred tax assets, pension costs, stock option costs and leasing.  
0.0076 
(4.96/ 
0.000) 
(n=216) 
0.0075 
(1.82/ 
0.076) 
(n=39) 
0.0052 
(1.38/ 
0.176) 
(n=39) 
0.0069 
(2.47/ 
0.016) 
(n=64) 
0.0095 
(2.68/ 
0.009) 
(n=65) 
 33 
(14) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-0.42/ 0.679) (-0.58/ 0.564) 
15 
Dec 
2004 
(15) 
The Basel Committee considered additional issues related to the potential impact on 
regulatory capital of the implementation of certain IFRS. The Committee accepts the 
IAS 39 treatment of impairment losses which reduce Tier 1 capital. The Committee 
also considers excluding unrealized gains and losses on loans designated as 
available-for-sale from the regulatory definition of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.  
 
0.0008 
(0.41/ 
0.685) 
(n=219) 
-0.0019 
(-0.72/ 
0.477) 
(n=39) 
0.0017 
(0.56/ 
0.577) 
(n=39) 
0.00001 
(0.01/ 
0.996) 
(n=64) 
0.0032 
(0.66/ 
0.514) 
(n=65) 
(15) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (0.90/ 0.373) (-0.58/ 0.562) 
11 
Apr 
2005 
(16) 
The Basel Committee and IOSCO propose solutions for certain trading-related 
exposures and double default effects under Basel II. The Basel Committee issued a 
paper for public comment outlining proposed capital requirements for banks’ 
exposures to certain trading-related activities, including counterparty credit risk and 
a solution for double default effects (the risk that both a borrower and guarantor 
default on the same obligation).  
 
-0.0018 
(-1.34/ 
0.180) 
(n=221) 
-0.0035 
(-1.54/ 
0.132) 
(n=39) 
0.0032 
(1.22/ 
0.228) 
(n=39) 
-0.0009 
(-0.34/ 
0.734) 
(n=64) 
-0.00002 
(-0.01/ 
0.993) 
(n=65) 
(16) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (1.93/ 0.057) (-0.25/ 0.803) 
13 
July 
2005 
(17) 
The Basel Committee issues documents on the use of fair value option,  estimation 
of loss given default (LGD) during economic downturns, treatment of certain 
trading-related exposures and double default effects under Basel II. This proposal 
does not impose additional accounting or disclosure requirements beyond those set 
out in IAS 39, except that gains and losses arising from changes in a bank's own 
credit risk associated with its liabilities should not be included in capital.  
 
-0.0044 
(-2.71/ 
0.007) 
(n=222) 
 
 
 
-0.0144 
(-3.42/ 
0.001) 
(n=39) 
0.0057 
(2.30/ 
0.027) 
(n=39) 
-0.0061 
(-2.03/ 
0.046) 
(n=64) 
-0.0015 
(-0.61/ 
0.543) 
(n=65) 
(17) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (4.12/ 0.000) (-1.18/ 0.240) 
18 Jul 
2005 
(18) 
The Basel Committee discussed solutions for the application of Basel II to some 
trading-related exposures, including counterparty credit risk and the treatment of 
double default effects, or the risk that both a borrower and guarantor default on the 
same obligation.  
-0.0025 
(-1.62/ 
0.106) 
(n=222) 
-0.0046 
(-1.82/ 
0.077) 
(n=39) 
-0.0038 
(-1.22/ 
0.231) 
(n=39) 
-0.0044 
(-1.73/ 
0.088) 
(n=64) 
-0.0063 
(-2.58/ 
0.012) 
(n=65) 
 34 
 
(18) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (0.20/ 0.839) (0.54/ 0.593) 
24 
May 
2006 
(19) 
The Basel Committee maintained calibration of Basel II Framework based on the 
results of the fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5). The QIS results for the G10 
countries show that minimum required capital under Pillar 1 of the Basel II 
Framework would decrease relative to the current Accord. For internationally active 
banks, minimum required capital would decrease on average by 6.8%, with greater 
reduction for the advanced IRB approach.  
 
0.0216 
(10.81/ 
0.000) 
(n=223) 
0.0109 
(4.13/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
0.0131 
(4.35/ 
0.000) 
(n=39) 
0.0144 
(5.57/ 
0.000) 
(n=64) 
0.0288 
(7.23/ 
0.000) 
(n=65) 
(19) t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (0.54/ 0.592) (-3.03/ 0.003) 
Events 
1-6 
3 Jun 1999 to 10 July 2002. The Basel Committee issued a consultative paper on 
Basel II, provided details via supplementary documents, issued the 2nd consultative 
package, and reached consensus on important issues and confirmed implementation 
timeline. 
 
-0.0096 
(-8.88/ 
0.000) 
(n=1224) 
-0.0030 
(-1.22/ 
0.222) 
(n=231) 
 
-0.0139 
(-6.68/ 
0.000) 
(n=233) 
-0.0069 
(-3.80/ 
0.000) 
(n=375) 
-0.0116 
(-6.38/ 
0.000) 
(n=383) 
1-6 t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 (-3.83/ 0.000) (2.75/ 0.006) 
Events 
7-12 
1 Oct 2002 to 11 May 2004. This period covers quantitative impact surveys, the 
issue of third consultative paper, agreement on cross border implementation and 
publication of comprehensive package. 
0.0068 
(9.29/ 
0.000) 
(n=1278) 
0.0119 
(8.28/ 
0.000) 
(n=234) 
0.0081 
(5.03/ 
0.000) 
(n=234) 
0.0112 
(9.51/ 
0.000) 
(n=384) 
0.0061 
(4.55/ 
0.000) 
(n=390) 
7-12 t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 (-1.15/ 0.251) (1.617/ 0.106) 
Events 
1-12 
3 Jun 1999 to 11 May 2004. From conceptualisation of Basel II to issues of 2nd and 
3rd consultative packages, and publication of comprehensive package.   
-0.0012 
(-1.82/ 
0.070) 
(n=2502) 
0.0045 
(3.04/ 
0.002) 
(n=465) 
-0.0029 
(-2.03/ 
0.043) 
(n=467) 
0.0022 
(1.99/ 
0.047) 
(n=759) 
-0.0026 
(-2.27/ 
0.023) 
(n=773|) 
1-12 t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-3.60/ 0.000) (3.02/ 0.003) 
 35 
Events 
13-19 
8 June 2004 to 24 May 2006. After the issue of comprehensive guidelines, further 
refinements on trading exposures, additional quantitative impact studies, evaluation 
of IFRS effects on capital rules to the last milestone before implementation of 
standardized approach. 
 
0.0033 
(5.16/ 
0.000) 
(n=1539) 
-0.0008 
(-0.68/ 
0.500) 
(n=273)   
0.0035 
(3.08/ 
0.002) 
(n=273) 
0.0014 
(1.38/ 
0.170) 
(n=448) 
0.0054 
(4.10/ 
0.000) 
(n=455) 
13-19 t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (2.59/ 0.010) (-2.40/ 0.017) 
Events 
1-19 
3 Jun 1999 to 24 May 2006. From issue of conceptual paper to last milestone before 
implementation of standardized approach in most banks at end 2006.  
0.0005 
(1.07/ 
0.286) 
(n=4041) 
0.0025 
(2.42/ 
0.016) 
(n=738) 
-0.0005 
(-0.52/ 
0.602) 
(n=740) 
0.0019 
(2.40/ 
0.016) 
(n=1207) 
0.0003 
(0.38/ 
0.705) 
(n=1228) 
1-19 t-test for diff between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp. groups (t stat/ p 
value) 
 
 (-2.09/ 0.034) (2.24/ 0.025) 
 
